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ABSTRACT This study analyses the relationship between checks and balances and
democracy, focusing on Turkey in comparative perspective. In a large-N setting, the effects of
checks and balances on the quality of democracy are examined. The findings reinforce the
essential relationship between democracy and checks and balances. The article then discusses
the implications of the findings for Turkey. It stresses the need for horizontal acc-
ountability via checks and balances vested in different state agencies. In addition to state-
level checks and balances, the importance of societal actors as sources of accountability is
also elaborated. The study identifies the need for vertical accountability, not only through free
elections but also by creating a political setting in which pluralistic media and civil society
can thrive. In light of findings, the article stresses the need for a new constitutional framework
that can embrace both state- and societal-level checks and balances.
Democracy, the catchphrase in today’s world, is the motto of politicians, NGOs and
grass-roots movements alike. Schmitter and Karl (1991: 75) aptly state that ‘the
word democracy has been circulating as a debased currency in the political
marketplace’. As regimes other than democracies have come to look like
anachronisms, political elites feel the need to create regimes that resemble
democracies. Transition to democracy is never the end of the story however.
Democratization is a work in progress and a vulnerable one at that. Challenges faced
by democracies include rapid overthrow as well as slow incremental regime
subversion (see O’Donnell 1992). As Schedler (1998: 97) maintains, ‘in addition to
the risk of breakdown – of dramatic, sudden, and visible relapses to authoritarian
rule – many new democracies have to contend with the danger of decay, of less
spectacular, more incremental, and less transparent forms of regression’. Huntington
(1996: 8) points to the predominance of the latter in recent democracies, stating that
‘[w]ith third wave democracies, the problem is not overthrow but erosion: the
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intermittent or gradual weakening of democracy by those elected to lead it’. While
significant accomplishments in and of themselves, elections alone cannot protect
regimes from sliding into semi-democracies. Nor can they ensure the development
of full-fledged democracies in which people can live in freedom and prosperity.
There are important steps that can be taken to prevent such democratic erosions.
Building a comprehensive institutional structure that can facilitate a democratically
functioning regime is one of the most important. This article discusses the role of
institutionalized checks and balances in the formation of strong democratic regimes.
It demonstrates the importance of checks and balances by developing a large-N
study regarding the effects of checks and balances on the quality of democracy.
It then shows the implications of the findings for the Turkish case. In addition to
state-level checks and balances, it elaborates on the importance of societal actors as
sources of accountability. It argues for a new constitutional framework that can
embrace both state- and societal-level checks and balances.
Checks and Balances as Institutional Foundations of Democracy
Institutions are rules that constrain political behaviour and define opportunities for
individual behaviour in political settings (Carey, 2000; Diermeier & Krehbiel,
2003). An institutional framework is the composite of rules, informal constraints
(norms of behaviour and conventions), and the mode of their enforcement, all
of which define the ‘humanly devised constraints that shape human interactions’.
To this end, institutions are the ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1990: 364; 1991: 97).
Institutions account for crucial political, social and economic outcomes
(Acemoglu et al., 2002). Institutions play three critical roles. First, understood as
historical products, they provide links between unsettled moments of great
transformation and more ordinary times. Second, they constrain and shape human
beliefs, values, interests and the way these are deployed to influence outcomes.
Third, they are understood to generate preferences (Katznelson & Weingast, 2005;
North et al., 2009; Shepsle, 1989).
Debates concerning democratic institutions have mainly revolved around the
institutional design of forms of government and electoral systems. In this study, we
will specifically focus on institutionalized checks and balances, which constitute
‘the principle of government under which separate branches are empowered to
prevent actions by other branches and are induced to share power’ (Encyclopedia
Britannica, 2013). The scholarship on checks and balances dates back to Aristotle
(1996), who posited that a stable ‘polity’ can only be achieved by the checks and
balances among different strata of the society. This ensures, according to Aristotle,
that no individual or class becomes dominant within a polity. Polybius (1980)
presented Sparta and Rome as success stories of checks and balances of his time,
both of which constituted a supplementary but not mutually exclusive division of
labour between different elements in the state that prevented each element from
becoming overambitious and encroaching upon the other.
Various reflections on these texts are found in the works of later scholars.
Montesquieu (1989: 155–157) underlined the importance of the separation of
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powers between executive, legislative and judicial bodies of the state and cautioned
that the union of these powers ‘in a single person or in a single body of the
magistracy’ would render political liberty impossible. Seconding this idea Madison
(1977: 348) added that each ‘department’ of government ‘should have a will of its
own’ and ‘should be as little dependent as possible on members of other
departments’ for the sake of the preservation of liberty.
In the absence of proper checks and balances, scholars of politics worry that
people will fall victim to what Tocqueville (1988) called the ‘tyranny of the
majority’. Mill asserted that the tyranny of the majority in a democracy is much
worse than the tyranny of one person since ‘it practices a social tyranny more
formidable than [any kind] of political oppression [as] . . . it leaves fewer means of
escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul
itself’ (Mill, 2007: 11).
The role of checks and balances in protecting democracies is as crucial as ever, if
not more so. Of particular significance here is the research on horizontal
accountability initiated by O’Donnell. Making Latin American cases his point of
departure, O’Donnell diagnosed the lack of horizontal accountability as the major
problem in most emerging democracies. O’Donnell defined horizontal account-
ability as:
the existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered, and
factually willing and able, to take actions that span from routine oversight to
criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by other
agents or agencies of the state that may be qualified as unlawful. (O’Donnell,
1999: 38)
O’Donnell maintained that elections alone could not fulfil the accountability role
in democracies. In the absence of horizontal accountability, O’Donnell (1998: 120)
painted the following apt picture that applies to most newly established
democracies:
Reasonably free and fair elections are held to decide who is to govern for a
certain time; governing is what is done by the executive, who has the right and
duty to look after the good of the country as he or she sees fit; if the electorate
grows unhappy, it can vote out the government in the next election – no less
and not much more. In this view . . . the existence of powers that are
autonomous with respect to the executive, especially when or if they are
supposed to exercise controls over the latter, is an utter nuisance. In the short
term, delegative executives tend to ignore such agencies, while elimination,
co-optation or neutralization are the preferred longer-term strategies.
Horizontal accountability is violated through encroachment when one state
agency trespasses upon the lawful authority of another. O’Donnell (1998: 122) held
that this intrinsically threatens to eliminate polyarchy and it ‘raises a stronger
obstacle to the emergence of relatively autonomous state agencies acting according
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to properly defined authority that characterizes formally institutionalized
polyarchies’.
Following O’Donnell, Cameron (2003: 101–106) argued that the greatest
challenge that newly emerging Latin American democracies face is not so much to
avoid a return to authoritarianism but to restrain democratically elected leaders from
acting undemocratically. This is so because while both the international and
domestic communities have little tolerance for overt military rule, there are ‘few
restraints on popularly elected leaders who choose to ignore their own constitutions
and ride roughshod over other deliberate institutions’. According to Cameron, one of
the main threats to democracy in Latin America, therefore, is the deficit of horizontal
accountability, or ‘the checks and balances in a constitutional system of the
separation of powers’. Cameron also pointed to elections as necessary but
insufficient components of democracy. In his view, separation of powers is equally
necessary since it provides the legal and constitutional conditions necessary for the
practice of horizontal accountability.
Özbudun (1996a) demonstrated that Turkey carries huge resemblances to Latin
American cases with regard to the characteristics laid out by O’Donnell, Cameron
and others. Özbudun maintained that while there is little reason that authoritarianism
will return in Turkey, there is ‘equally little reason to hope that democracy will soon
become consolidated . . . Turkish democracy may endure, but in a state of “inherent
vulnerability”’ (Özbudun, 1996a: 137).
Concentrating directly on judicial checks and balances, Hayek (1960) and La
Porta et al. (2004) distinguished two ways in which the judiciary provides political
checks and balances: judicial independence and constitutional review. According to
these scholars, the judicial branch should independently enforce the laws enacted by
legislatures. Moreover, law-making and policy-making bodies should be subject to
review by the courts. La Porta et al. (2004: 446–447) specifically underlined that
‘judicial independence promotes both economic and political freedom, the former
by resisting the state’s attempts to take property, the latter by resisting its attempts to
suppress dissent’. Furthermore, they contended that constitutional review is a
necessity against the potential self-serving behaviour of the executive and/or the
legislature. It is thus vital to conserve these two functions of the judiciary so as to
‘counter the tyranny of the majority, to secure political and human rights, and to
preserve democracy’.
As we have seen, the checks and balances–democracy nexus occupies scholars as
much as it did in the past, if not more. We will now empirically test the relationship
between checks and balances and democracy using our large-N research model.
Unveiling the Relationship between Checks and Balances and Democracy:
A Large-N Cross-Sectional Analysis
Researchers have long underlined the significance of effective and institutionalized
constraints on each branch of government, especially the executive (Kapstein &
Converse, 2008). Diamond (2008: 38) maintained that the expansion of executive
power in the face of other branches of government and opposition forces, as seen in
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the cases of Nigeria and Russia in recent years, ‘have extinguished even the most
basic form of electoral democracy’. The ‘fallacy of electoralism’, as Diamond put it,
glosses over degradations of democracy (see also Karl & Schmitter, 1991).
There are statistical tests that trace the relationship between checks and balances
and democracy (e.g. Kapstein & Converse, 2008). However, these studies suffer
from a vital problem in their analyses. Specifically, the authors end up running
statistical tests using variables that have the same components of the Polity IV index
on both sides of their statistical analysis, i.e. their independent and dependent
variables (executive constraints variable against the polity2 variable, respectively),
causing a problem of endogeneity. Such an oversight reminds us that we cannot be
careful enough in our selection of variables both for checks and balances and
democracy.
To measure checks and balances, we offer a set of alternative indices to ensure a
robust analysis. We will use all of these alternative indices in our statistical tests one
by one against our democracy measure, which is explained below. Our first checks
and balances variable is the EXCONST variable from the Polity IV index by
Marshall et al. (2011: 14), which ‘refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints
on the decision making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or
collectivities’, including ‘legislatures and a strong, independent judiciary’. The
variable is between 0 and 10; 10 referring to the best level of checks and balances.
Our second checks and balances variable, the ‘Checks’ variable by Beck et al.
(2001) from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (DPI) is also widely
used. The latest version of the ‘Checks’ variable in the DPI by Keefer (2012)
specifies the variable in light of:
-president’s party’s majority in the lower house and a closed list system,
and alliance of other parties with the governing party (in presidential
systems);
-coalition formation to maintain majority, party positions on economic
issues and the presence/absence of closed-list system (in parliamentary
systems);
-the presence/absence of competitive elections for legislature and
executive; control of the legislature by opposition (or not) (in all systems).
A Higher ‘Checks’ score denotes a higher quality of checks and balances. Our
third checks and balances variable is the POLCON indicator from Henisz’s (2010)
Political Constraint Index. This indicator works along the same lines as the DPI’s
‘Checks’ variable and identifies the number of independent branches of government
(executive, lower and upper legislative chambers) with veto power over policy
change. However, according to Henisz, this variable supersedes the explanatory
power of the ‘Checks’ variable by Keefer (2012) and Beck et al. (2001), since the
‘Checks’ variable assumes a ‘linear relationship between the number of adjusted
veto points and the degree of constraints on policy change’ and linear adjustment of
veto points ‘without regard to the relative size of the parties in the coalition’ in
parliamentary systems whereas the POLCON variable ‘relies upon a simple spatial
model of political interaction to derive the extent to which any one political actor or
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the replacement for any one actor is constrained in his/her choice of future policies’
(Henisz, 2004: 9; emphases added). The variable is continuous between 0 and 1; 1
referring to the best level of checks and balances. The correlation matrix of all of our
checks and balances indicators is shown in Appendix A.
In a study that examines the impact of checks and balances on democracy, one
should be very careful about the selection of the democracy variable. Utilizing a
democracy variable that incorporates checks and balances directly as one of its
components (as in the case of Polity IV indicators, such as the widely used Polity2
variable) would render the statistical analysis meaningless because of the
endogeneity issues already discussed.
The conceptualization of the variables at hand is one of the most serious
challenges social scientists face. Without ‘the identification of attributes that are
constitutive of the concept under consideration’ and without ‘avoiding the problems
of redundancy and conflation’, one cannot be sure about the validity and reliability of
the data generation and subsequent data analysis (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002: 7–8).
Surely, the nature of one’s study dictates how narrow/wide a definition one will
utilize (Hollyer et al., 2011). Maximalist definitions limit the analytical utility of a
concept and risk excluding several interesting research questions from analysis.
On the other hand, minimalist definitions may omit attributes that are generally
considered to be intrinsic to the concept at hand (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002: 9–11).
For the case of democracy, many researchers have directly and indirectly contributed
to the literature by creating multiple democracy indices. However, even some of the
most prominent ones fail to incorporate some key components of democracy. This is
most evident for the case of participation. Specifically, well-known and widely used
democracy indices such as Polity IV (Marshall et al., 2011), Alvarez et al. (1996),
and Bollen (2001) fail to incorporate participation into their conceptualizations of
democracy (see Munck & Verkuilen, 2002: 28).
This article underlines the importance of the participatory aspects of democracy.
In a study that investigates the relationship between checks and balances and
democracy, the role of participation cannot be omitted. Our conceptualization of
democracy should be wide enough to integrate various aspects of a well-functioning
democracy, such as political participation and civil liberties, yet concise enough not
to conflate with our checks and balances variable.
At the end of a meticulous search for an apt democracy variable,1we have decided
to use the ‘Democracy Index’ compiled annually by the Economist Intelligence Unit
(EIU) (Kekic, 2007). We use the most recent index, which was published in 2012.
The Democracy Index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism;
civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political
culture.2 It is a graded index (between 0 and 10; 10 referring to the highest quality of
democracy). This is in line with our expectations from an index to gauge even the
slightest changes in the quality of democracy. We agree with Collier and Adcock
(1999) and Elkins (2000), who suggested that graded measures of democracy have
superior validity and reliability over dichotomous measures.3
Before delving into the details of our analysis, we would like to show the one-to-
one relationship of checks and balances and democracy in scatter-plots to set the
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mindset for our quantitative analysis and help us grasp the correlation between our
main variables. Figures 1, 2 and 3 clearly illustrate the positive relationship between
checks and balances and the quality of democracy. Using multiple indices for checks
and balances reinforces our conviction on this.
After illustrating this one-to-one relationship, we would now like to add control
variables into our analysis to further our claims about the correlation between checks
and balances and democracy. To do this, we conduct a cross-sectional analysis in
light of the most recent data for all of the variables. The basic form of our OLS
regression is as follows:
Democracy Indexi ¼ b0 þ b1 £ Checks&BalancesVariablei þ Zi þ 1i;
where:
Democracy Index i: Democracy Index for country i,
b0: the constant term,
b1: the coefficient of the checks and balances variable, the coefficient of
























Figure 1. The relationship between EXCONST and the Democracy Index. Notes: Most
updated data used for both of the variables. N ¼ 158. Sources: EUI for the Democracy Index;

























Figure 2. The relationship between Checks (WB-DPI) and the Democracy Index. Notes:
Most updated data used for both of the variables. N ¼ 150. Sources: EUI for Democracy
Index; WB-DPI for Checks. Data compiled by the authors.
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Zi: Vector of control variables,
1 i: The random error term.
One-to-one relationships in a statistical analysis are interesting and can tell us a
lot about the relationship between two variables. Yet we should not confine
ourselves to these relationships. A meticulous study that examines the quality of
democracy (in light of checks and balances) calls for inclusion of multiple control
variables.
There are many studies that research the determinants of democracy, which can
help us find out what to take into account (Boix, 2011; Acemoglu et al., 2009). One
of the most prominent factors to consider is the economic well-being in a country.
In fact, originating from Lipset’s (1959) seminal study, the modernization
hypothesis, which investigates the casual relationship between economic well-being
and democracy, constitutes one of the core strands of the literature. Scholars such as
Barro (1999), Geddes (1999), Boix and Stokes (2003) and Boix (2011) aver that
economic development has a causal effect on democratization whereas Przeworski
and Limongi (1997), Alvarez et al. (1996) and Robinson (2006) maintain that the
causal power of economic development in bringing down dictatorships appears to be
statistically insignificant.
Democratic governments are certainly compatible with a wide range of social and
economic systems, as is the case for a variety of authoritarian regimes (see Linz,
2000). However, economic well-being and democracy can be correlated (and this
may not be a causal mechanism) since many societal forces can simultaneously
determine how prosperous and how democratic a country is (Robinson, 2006: 503).
Therefore, we expect to find a positive correlation between our economic well-being
variable and quality of democracy. Our economic affluence variable is log GDP per
capita (World Bank, 2013).
Other than economic well-being, education can also influence the quality of
























Figure 3. The relationship between POLCON and the Democracy Index. Notes: Most
updated data used for both of the variables. N ¼ 161. Sources: EUI for the Democracy Index;
Henisz (2010) for POLCON. Data compiled by the authors.
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ability to come up with well-informed political decisions. Avelino et al. (2005)
underline the strong positive association between education and democracy through
education’s impact to bolster human capital formation. In a similar vein, Dalton and
Wattenberg (2000) state that increasing educational levels will improve the political
and cognitive resources of the electorate.
To capture the significance of education, we propose to use two variables: (i) the
average years of primary school attainment for persons aged 25; (ii) the gap in
average years of primary attainment between males and females aged 25 and over
(see Barro & Lee, 2010). We anticipate a positive coefficient for the attainment
variable and a negative coefficient for the gender gap for the educational attainment
variable because we agree with the aforementioned authors on education that
improving levels of education has a positive effect on democracy and that ‘expanded
educational opportunity for females goes along with a social structure that is
generally more participatory and, hence, more receptive to democracy’ (Barro,
1999: 167).
Another potentially important variable is natural resource endowment. There is an
extensive literature on how natural resources ‘may enable the state to buy off society
with low taxation and high social spending and thereby allay popular demand for
political accountability’ (Fish, 2005: 84). Natural resources may also be used for
repressing challengers and to hinder socioeconomic transformations accompanying
prosperity (Ross, 2001). We measure natural resource endowment as the total
income from natural resources (the sum of oil, natural gas, coal, mineral and forest
rents) as a percentage of GDP (World Bank, 2013). We expect a negative coefficient
for this measure.
Sociocultural factors can also affect the quality of democracy. Specifically,
experts have long suggested that ethnolinguistic fractionalization can hamper the
prospects for democracy (Karatnycky, 2002). Ethnic conflict literature underlines
the challenges posed by ethnic divisions to the quality of democracy (Horowitz,
1993). We use Alesina et al.’s (2003) widely used indicator for ethnolinguistic
fractionalization. We expect to have a negative coefficient for this measure too.
Summary statistics of all of our variables are in Appendix B.
In short, we calculate the correlation between checks and balances (in light of
multiple indices) and democracy, controlling for various economic and socio-
political factors. The results of our analysis are shown below in Table 1.
We run each of our checks and balances variables in separate regressions, with the
aforementioned controls. Therefore, we have three columns of findings, column (1)
with the EXCONST variable, column (2) with Checks-DPI and column (3) with the
POLCON. The most significant finding in our regressions is the importance of
checks and balances for democracy. Multivariate, cross-sectional analysis of
approximately 120 countries clearly reveals that all of our alternative indices for
checks and balances (i.e. EXCONST, Checks-DPI and POLCON) are highly
significant for the quality of democracy, when controlled for various economic and
sociopolitical variables. For instance, the EXCONST variable from Polity IV is
shown to increase the quality of democracy index by 0.663, as seen in the first
column. Likewise, Checks-DPI and POLCON raise the quality of democracy
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significantly, with coefficients of 0.557 and 3.366 respectively, both at the 1 per cent
significance level.
Other than checks and balances, the results are broadly supportive of the idea that
more prosperous places are more likely to be democratic. The estimated coefficient
on per capita GDP is significantly positive, around 0.56 in all of our alternative
regressions. This supports the arguments that underline a positive correlation
between economic well-being and democracy (barring any causation argument,
which is not the scope of this research). We also find that the natural resource
endowment variable is highly significant in all of our regressions. This finding
confirms the natural resource curse argument.
Our education variables are not significant with other controls but one-to-one
regressions of primary school attainment and gender gap in educational attainment
with democracy show us that they are individually significant for the quality of
democracy at 1 per cent, yielding coefficients of 0.779 (positive as expected) and
23.388 (negative as anticipated), respectively. Likewise, the ethnolinguistic
fractionalization variable is highly significant (at 1 per cent) in one-to-one regression
with the quality of democracy, with a coefficient of 23.683 (negative as expected).
However, it ceases to be significant in the multivariate regressions.






Constant 22.413** 20.610 20.408
(1.092) (1.391) (1.493)
Checks & Balances 0.663*** 0.557*** 3.366***
(0.063) (0.100) (0.757)
Log GDP per Capita 0.541*** 0.579*** 0.564***
(0.115) (0.140) (0.154)
Primary School Attainment 0.044 0.065 0.160
(0.089) (0.106) (0.107)
Gender Gap of Educational 20.016 20.809 20.351
Attainment (0.503) (0.610) (0.628)
Natural Resource Endowment 20.017** 20.049*** 20.037***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 20.203 20.017 20.274
(0.452) (0.535) (0.581)
Adjusted R2 0.761 0.663 0.624
Observations 126 122 129
Notes: Standard deviations in the parentheses. ***denotes p , 0.01; **p , 0.05. Sources: The
EUI for the Democracy Index 2012; Marshall et al. (2011) for EXCONST; Keefer et al.
(2012) for Checks-DPI, Henisz (2010) for POLCON; World Bank (2013) for GDP per
capita (PPP-2005 constant international dollars); Barro and Lee (2010) for primary school
attainment and gender gap in educational attainment; World Bank (2013) for natural
resource endowment; Alesina et al. (2003) for ethnolinguistic fractionalization. Data are
compiled by the authors. Statistical analysis is done in E-Views.
10 351Building Democracy to Last
All in all, our cross-sectional study of over 120 countries finds that improvements
in checks and balances strongly predict increases in the quality of democracy.
Furthermore, the quality of democracy rises with per capita GDP. It is also found to
be negatively correlated with natural resource endowment. Primary school
enrolment and gender gap in educational attainment are individually significant in
determining the quality of democracy, as is ethnolinguistic fractionalization.
However, the apparently strong relationship of democracy with educational
attainment and ethnolinguistic fractionalization mostly disappears when we
introduce our checks and balances variable. Our findings verify our conviction
that the institutionalization of proper checks is vital for democracy.
Lessons for the Turkish Case
Our quantitative findings demonstrate the indispensable role checks and balances
play in democracies. While providing us with invaluable information, these findings
need to be substantiated with in-depth case studies for a fuller picture. This will help
us complement the snapshot view provided by the cross-sectional statistical analysis
with a more dynamic tracing of the elements of checks and balances at work. To this
end, we explore the impact of checks and balances on democracy by specifically
focusing on the Turkish case. Our findings highlight the importance of
institutionalized checks and balances for the proper functioning of Turkish
democracy.4 Before delving into the details of the discussion of the Turkish case,
however, reviewing the current status and trends in Turkish democracy will help us
make better sense of the following discussions.
The AKP came to power in 2002, in what later proved to be a ‘critical election’
which fundamentally shifted macro-partisanship patterns in Turkey (Jefferson West,
2005). The AKP presented itself as a system-oriented, religiously conservative
party, unlike its Islamist predecessors such as the Welfare Party (Yeşilada, 2002).
The early years of AKP rule included reforms in crucial areas of freedom of
expression and civilian control of the military, which were applauded by many
domestic observers and international institutions, especially the EU (Ulusoy, 2013).
However, the ruling party started to display signs of ‘reform fatigue’ in 2005,
‘hesitating to push hard for implementation and enforcement of the rights-based
reforms that it had so assertively legislated’ (Patton, 2007: 340; see also Kubicek,
2013). After consolidating its power with successive electoral victories and
establishing itself as a predominant party, the AKP has started to show authoritarian
tendencies in its later years of government. The AKP’s current rule is characterized
by a ‘drift towards an excessively majoritarian conception of democracy, or even an
electoral authoritarianism of a more markedly Islamic character’, over-
concentration of power at the new ‘centre’ of Turkish politics, around Erdoğan’s
personalistic rule, marginalized and alienated liberal segments of the AKP’s once
broad-based coalition, and serious intimidation of the opposition evidenced by
multiple crackdowns on journalists, activists and academics (Özbudun, 2014: 1; see
also Kubicek, 2013; Keyman, 2014; Öniş, 2014). Lacking adequate checks and
balances by independent judiciary and free media and civil society organizations,
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the AKP rule in Turkey has become ‘plebiscitarian’, adopting an illiberal conception
of democracy that downgrades legitimate instruments of accountability only to the
results at the ballot box (Pierini, 2013; Özbudun, 2014). The remainder of the article
will discuss the role of checks and balances and the future of Turkish democracy
with this political context in mind.
An important issue concerning Turkish democracy today is the presidentialism
debate. There are diverging views on whether the choice of presidentialism or
parliamentarism suits democratic regimes more. We will not delve into that
discussion. We will however highlight the problematic aspects found in the
presidential model proposed by the governing AKP in its current form.
While presidentialism can, in theory, maintain effective checks and balances, this
requires the institutionalization of such mechanisms in the system, which includes
bicameralism, mutual veto powers, federalism. In the absence of such mechanisms,
a presidential regime can endanger checks and balances as well as the proper
functioning of democracy. Cameron (2003) sums up the threats faced by presidential
democracies lacking institutionalized horizontal accountability. Various forms of
encroachment of one branch of government upon the jurisdiction and competence of
another include the following:
In presidential self-coups, or autogolpes, presidents may suspend the
constitution, fire the supreme court, close congress, and rule by decree until a
plebiscite or a new election is held to ratify a new regime with wider executive
powers. In less extreme cases, presidents may stack courts, abdicate their
authority over the military in cases of human rights violations, abuse executive
decree authority, refuse to accept legislative oversight, limit freedom of the
press or use public resources to undermine the development of political parties
and local governments. (Cameron, 1998: 125)
Regarding the current debates on presidentialism in Turkey, Özbudun (2013)
states that, as it stands, the current model resembles the Latin American examples of
superpresidentialism more than the American model. According to Özbudun, this is
especially the case because it gives the president the right to dissolve the parliament
and rule by decree. It also puts the judiciary under the control of the executive.
Özbudun’s conclusions are in line with O’Donnell’s observations on Latin
American democracies. Özbudun finds that if the proposed switch to presidentialism
is implemented, Turkey will not necessarily end up as an authoritarian regime but it
will be far away from high-quality democracy. It could even turn into a semi-
democracy, in which all opposition forces are silenced.
The AKP’s proposal for a new constitution reveals that the checks and balances
aspect of the new presidential regime they propose will be highly problematic. The
proposal clearly shows that the AKP aims to empower the executive at the expense
of other branches by ‘authorizing the president to (a) issue decree laws, (b) dissolve
Parliament, (c) appoint Cabinet members without parliamentary approval, and (d)
appoint more than a third of the members of the Supreme Board of Judges and
prosecutors (HYSK)’ (Cited in Kuru, 2013: 572; See proposal at Hürriyet, 2013).
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In light of the AKP proposal, Kalaycıoğlu complains that ‘no institutional
mechanism of checks and balances exists between the branches of the government’
(Kalaycıoğlu, 2013: 62; see also Öniş, 2013: 115; Özbudun, 2014).
The problem about checks and balances in the Turkish democracy are not limited to
presidentialism debates.With the lack of sufficient checks and balances, democracies
face the risk of turning into delegative rather than representative democracies.
In delegative democracies ‘a caesaristic, plebiscitarian executive . . . once elected
sees itself as empowered to govern the country as it deems fit’ (O’Donnell, 1996: 44).
O’Donnell maintains that in such democracies we often find that checks and balances
are seen as disturbances, rather than guarantees of the regimes.
This is especially so because of the pressures of keeping up with the demands of
socioeconomic conditions:
Reinforced by the urgencies of severe socioeconomic crises and consonant
with old volkisch, nonindividualistic conceptions of politics, delegative
practices strive headlong against formal political institutionalization;
congress, the judiciary, and various state agencies of control are seen as
hindrances placed in the way of the proper discharge of the tasks that the
voters have delegated to the executive. The executive’s efforts to weaken
these institutions, invade their legal authority, and lower their prestige are a
logical corollary of this view. (O’Donnell, 1996: 44–45)
Similarly to O’Donnell, Smulovitz and Peruzzotti (2000: 148) aptly explain in
their discussion of the weaknesses of horizontal mechanisms of accountability in
Latin America:
Although power is divided, the judicial and legislative branches are not
considered fully legitimatemechanisms for controlling or limiting the actions of a
delegative executive; instead, they are perceived as obstacles that hinder
governmental effectiveness andundermine thewill of themajority.This results in
presidentialdiscrecionalismo, which openly erodes a central feature of horizontal
accountability: the existence of effective governmental checks and balances.
These warnings resonate with the Turkish case and deserve further attention.
A case in point is the complaints of government officials, including the then Prime
Minister and now the President Erdoğan, about checks and balances and the
separation of powers as factors that slow down the implementation of government
policies. For instance, talking about a hospital project called Şehir Hastaneleri (City
Hospitals) that was stopped by the Council of State following the complaints of the
Turkish Medical Association (Türk Tabipleri Birliği), Erdoğan (2013) stated:
The thing called separation of powers stands as an impediment in front of
us . . . The legislature, executive and judiciary need to think first and
foremost about the interests of the nation and then of the state. It is only that
way we can become strong.
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Erdoğan added that by delaying their projects, the judiciary harmed the interests
of the country. Erdoğan criticized not only the judiciary but also the main opposition
party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) as part of the legislature. Addressing its
leader Kılıcdaroğlu, Erdoğan (2013) said:
They are blocking us as much as possible during the legislative process. They
shout and yell. What would have taken an hour takes two hours as a result.
What would have taken only one day, takes two days. Of course, they do not
have a problem with wasting time . . . We have responsibility. They neither
have such responsibility, nor do they have love. We care and we are in love
with this nation. This makes us different.
Burhan Kuzu, an AKP MP and head of the Parliamentary Constitutional
Commission, similarly complained about the dispersion of power. Speaking in
support of a presidential system, he metaphorically stated that ‘whoever holds the
drum [davul] should also hold the stick [tokmak]’ (Radikal, 2013). While it is
understandable that feelings expressed by Erdoğan and Kuzu find support among
politicians and the population, closer scrutiny shows that there is not a trade-off
between democracy, stability and efficiency. Henisz (2004: 6) asserts that checks
and balances reduce political volatility as they ‘minimize the ability of politicians to
respond to short-term political or social incentives to favor one group over another
or transfer resources from society to the public sector’. The presence of veto points
not only affects policy stability positively, but also policy credibility. Deterioration
in the checks and balances may in fact hamper the policy credibility of governments.
According to Daley et al. (2007), such deterioration leads citizens to refrain from
committing to contractual, investment or other types of economic decisions.
Furthermore, Keefer and Knack (2007) add that the lack of credible commitments by
governments brings about the loss of confidence on the side of citizens against
government expropriation of valuables. These researchers underline the importance
of certain veto powers, specifically the legislative checks of the executive. These
points illustrate that populist arguments made by politicians presenting economic
and political development as trade-offs to representative and pluralistic democracies
do not depict the whole picture.
One of the underlying reasons for this dissonance between elected government
officials and other state institutions was addressed by Heper (1992) in his study on
the Turkish state tradition. Heper (1992) illustrated that as a result of the Ottoman-
Turkish historical trajectory, there was a mutual distrust between the state elites and
the political elites. One of the results of this was that the military was eager to
intervene when it deemed it necessary for the societal good, at the expense of
politicians, whom the state elites viewed as egotistical, short-sighted and
irresponsible. More than two decades have passed since Heper’s study. As Öniş
(2014: 207) also maintains,
key actors in Turkish politics such as the military and the Kemalist
bureaucracy including the foreign policy establishment progressively lost their
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dominant status in the center of Turkish politics, as the AKP increasingly
acquired a hegemonic position in the Turkish political system.
The power of state elites (particularly the military) to intervene in the spheres of
the democratically elected governments has diminished significantly. On the other
hand, the inclination of political elites to delegitimize state elites and discredit their
efforts is still a persistent theme in Turkish politics, as especially illustrated by
Erdoğan, who, among other instances, interferes in the working of the Central Bank
by constantly challenging its policies and claiming ‘This sort of thing would almost
drive one mad!’ (Financial Times, 2015).
A couple of other examples will provide a fuller picture of the current state of
horizontal accountability in Turkey. A case in point is the fact that the powers of the
Court of Accounts, which is responsible for supervising government spending in the
name of parliament, were curtailed (Özbudun, 2014: 9). A more recent example
concerns the government’s attitude towards the prosecution of corruption starting in
December 2013 and the changes to the judiciary proposed by the government in the
aftermath. This case exemplifies the encroachment of the executive upon the
judiciary and the executive’s attempt to gain immunity from being held accountable
for its actions. In response to the corruption inquiry involving ministers of the
government and their children and relatives, as well as some top-level bureaucrats,
the government purged hundreds of members of the police and the judiciary. The
government also attempted to use it to gain greater control over the judiciary. The
AKP drafted a bill to give the executive more control over the appointment of judges
and prosecutors (Reuters, 2014). When legal experts, business circles and the EU
raised concerns over the expansion of the executive at the expense of the judiciary,
Erdoğan responded: ‘if we consider the judiciary as a separate power, then this
would lead to a country of judicial rule and not democracy’ (Reuters, 2014). With
the attitude adopted in the aforementioned case, the government made clear that
every attempt to check and balance it through horizontal accountability mechanisms
will be perceived as a threat.
So far, we have discussed the importance of horizontal accountability, or state-
level checks and balances for democracies. In addition to horizontal accountability
mechanisms, O’Donnell (1996) also talks about vertical accountability mechanisms
through which citizens control the government. Except for elections, O’Donnell
(1996) does not engage with vertical accountability mechanisms in detail (see also
Smulovitz & Peruzzotti, 2000). He does state however that, in addition to elections,
vertical accountability ensures that ‘a reasonably free press and various active
segments of society see to it that some egregiously unlawful acts of government are
exposed’ (O’Donnell, 1996: 44). Freedoms of speech, the press and association
‘permit citizens to voice social demands to public officials (elected or not) and to
denounce these same officials for wrongful acts that they may commit’ (O’Donnell,
1998: 112–113). His suggestions for better checks and balances also include
references to the role of societal actors in maintaining accountable governments.
O’Donnell encourages the media and social organizations to remain active and
persistent. He adds that:
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because of the vital role of information in making possible both kinds of
accountability, new polyarchies need not only independent media, research,
and dissemination institutions, but also agencies independent of the
government that gather and publicly circulate data on a broad range of
indicators, economic and otherwise. (O’Donnell, 1998: 122)
O’Donnell is not alone in his emphasis on societal checks and balances.
In different time frames, Tocqueville (1988) and Diamond (1994) stressed the
importance of civil society organizations as important checks and balances to state
and governmental power. Currently, Turkey stands in a disadvantaged position with
regard to such rights. Its historical legacy of a strong, centralized and highly
bureaucratic state prevented the emergence of more balanced state–society relations
(Heper, 1985; Özbudun, 1996a, 1996b). Hence, a constitutional and institutional
framework in which agents of vertical accountability (such as the media and civil
society associations) can prosper is crucial.
The Turkish state has always been the dominant actor in Turkish politics and the
rule of law was always problematic. But except for the single-party rule until 1950,
politicians had to share power with their coalition partners. The nature of coalition
governments prevented full control of a single party over state resources and the
media. But especially after the AKP’s consolidation of its single-party power,
maintaining a critical stance in the media has become more and more difficult. Many
journalists have in fact been fired from their jobs (television and/or newspaper) or
have been forced to resign due to their criticism of Erdoğan. These include
prominent journalists and columnists such as Hasan Cemal, Can Dündar, Nuray
Mert, Nazli Ilıcak, Mehmet Altan and Yılmaz Özdil (CPJ, 2013; Filkins, 2012;
Hasan, 2012). Overall, Turkey’s record of journalistic freedom has worsened under
the AKP government (Yesil, 2014; Corke et al., 2014).
Finally, as an intermediary between state and society, we also need to mention the
importance of parties for the proper functioning of checks and balances.
As MacPherson (1971: 239–246) argues, political parties serve as checks and
balances by acting as ‘safeguard[s] against a permanent irresponsible oligarchy’ and
as ‘check[s] to abuse of power, by providing always an alternative body of occupants
for the commanding positions’. In the Turkish case, due to strong party discipline
and the absence of intraparty democracy, ‘MPs are highly dependent and docile’
(Özbudun, 1996a: 137). As a result, “[s]trong party discipline often stymied
parliamentary mechanisms of accountability. Election campaigns stressed the
personal qualities and trustworthiness of individual leaders, rather than party
programs and policies. Party leaders were presented as “saviors of the country”’
(Özbudun, 1996a: 136–137). Thus, in order to enable a dynamic system of checks
and balances, the inner workings of Turkish parties need to be restructured.
Conclusion
In our comparative study of the Turkish case, we have tried to synthesize theoretical
debates, contextually informed case studies and statistical results to illustrate the
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indispensable relationship between democracy and checks and balances. Our findings
demonstrate that proper checks and balances sit at the heart of a high-quality
democracy. Thus, the institutionalization of checks and balances, both horizontally
and vertically, is a requirement for the survival of democracy in Turkey. There are
multiple mechanisms through which the horizontal and vertical dimensions of
accountability can be enhanced. The strengthening and autonomy of state agencies is
key to ensuring horizontal accountability. In addition, not only free and fair elections,
but also the creation of a political setting in which pluralistic media and civil society
can thrive are crucial for vertical accountability. This can only be achieved if the
search for a new constitution can be turned into a consensus-based and participatory
process that can create a representative, multi-vocal constitution and democracy.
Notes
1. Prominent indices such as Freedom House Index (2013) and Vanhanen (2000) suffer from serious
problems of conceptualization, measurement and aggregation (see Munck & Verkuilen, 2002: 28).
Polity IV, Alvarez et al. (1996) and Bollen (2001) conceptualize democracy too thin for the coverage
of our research. Furthermore, Polity2 in Polity IV includes ‘constraints on chief executive’ as one of its
components. Thus, we cannot use this variable as it is directly linked with our independent variable.
2. ‘Electoral process and pluralism’ refers to the existence of free and fair competitive elections. ‘Civil
liberties’ underlines the importance of the protection of basic human rights such as freedom of speech,
expression and the press, freedom of religion and freedom of assembly and association. ‘Functioning of
government’ refers to the capacity of governments to implement their decisionswithout any interference.
A democratic ‘political culture’ highlights the significance of a politically active populace that accepts the
judgement of the electoral processes andallows for thepeaceful transfer of power. ‘Political participation’
denotes active, freely chosen participation of citizens in public life (Kekic, 2007: 2).
3. Most prominent dichotomous measures of democracy such as Przeworski et al. (2000), Boix et al.
(2007) and Cheibub et al. (2009) fail to gauge the gradations of democracy, especially in the middle
levels of democratic quality, which includes our main case, Turkey. Therefore, using a dichotomous
index such as these would have jeopardized the accuracy, reliability and validity of our results. Thus,
we have chosen a graded measure of democracy.
4. Deriving inferences for single-country cases from large-N analysis should be done carefully. However,
Turkey is not an outlier for checks and balances and democracy. To this end, we believe that the
findings of our large-N analysis should be applied for the Turkish case. Our qualitative and in-depth
analysis of Turkish politics reinforces this fact.
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Appendix A – Correlation Matrix of Checks and Balances Variables
Appendix B – Summary Statistics for All of Our Variables
EXCONST (Polity IV) Checks (DPI) POLCON (Henisz)
EXCONST (Polity IV) 1
Checks (DPI) 0.544 1
POLCON (Henisz) 0.622 0.732 1
Sources: Marshall et al. (2011) for EXCONST; Beck et al. (2001) and Keefer et al. (2012) for
Checks; and Henisz (2010) for POLCON. Data are compiled by the authors.




Quality of Democracy 5.50 5.85 9.80 1.08 2.20 162
Independent Variables for Checks and Balances:
Executive Constraints
(Polity IV)
5.05 6.00 7.00 1.00 2.02 160
Checks (DPI) 2.87 3.00 8.00 1.00 1.45 152
POLCON (Henisz) 0.30 0.36 0.72 0.00 0.21 163
Control Variables:
Log GDP per capita 8.76 8.93 11.26 5.79 1.29 158
Primary school attainment 4.47 4.95 8.75 1.03 1.54 136
Gender gap in educational
attainment
0.24 0.13 1.22 20.83 0.30 136
Natural Resource
Endowment
9.91 3.28 69.33 0.00 14.73 159
Ethnolinguistic
Fractionalization
0.45 0.48 0.93 0.00 0.26 162
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